In Naming and Necessity 1 Kripke accuses Frege of conflating two notions of meaning (or sense), one is meaning proper, the other is determining of reference (p. 59). More precisely, Kripke argues that Frege conflated the question of how the meaning of a word is given or determined with the question of how its reference is determined. The criterial mark of meaning determination, according to Kripke, is a statement of synonymy: if we
One may wonder whether this causal theory of reference determination has not gone too far in its non-cognitive orientation. For the notions of reference and reference determination serve in a theory of meaning whose ultimate goal is to account for our use of words in our language. The causal chain, of which the speaker need not, and usually is not, aware may lead to a referent he doesn't know, and of which he hasn't even dreamt; it may lead to something utterly and categorically incompatible with whatever he intended to say. In fact it may lead to nothing at all. This may be entirely unknown to the speaker, and hence hardly affect his use of the terms involved. If the picture of reference determination is thus detached from anything that is within the cognitive horizons of the speaker, how can an account of his use of these words be gained on its basis? 3 A quite common retort here (possibly held by Kripke himself) is that semantics and theories of reference should be separated from the cognitive aspects of our use of language. These aspects are of course important but they should be dealt with in other terms and by separate theories. 4 I believe that such a move undermines one of Frege's greatest insights: that a theory of thought, in its wide sense, cannot be thus detached from a theory of meaning; it is dependent on it and constrained by it. Again the issues involved are very intricate and I shall not go into them here.
In the first part of what follows I shall describe Kripke's modal conception of meaning, which I regard as a novel and important notion of meaning. This, alongside with the non-cognitive attitude towards meaning and reference-determination sketched above, form, perhaps, the most significant contribution to the conception of meaning in this celebrated monograph. It may appear that the modal notion of meaning is a feature of the non-cognitive approach to meaning. The relationships between these two central doctrines is, however, more complicated than might at first sight seem, and I suggest that the modal conception is not, in itself, opposed to the cognitive conception, and can be incorporated in it. In the second part of this paper I shall examine Kripke's argument against Frege's (cognitive) conception of sense from a Fregean perspective. I shall try to
show that the modal conception of meaning in itself does not suffice for discarding Frege's cognitive conception of sense and of reference determination. A Fregean cognitive conception of meaning may be, therefore compatible with something like the modal conception of meaning, or so I shall argue.
I mean to focus here on NN exclusively, but I cannot avoid mentioning an interesting link between this non-cognitive trend in NN and the view Kripke Kripke elaborates a bit more on the notion of the meaning of words:
The notion of what words can mean in the language, is semantical: it is given by the conventions of our language. What they mean, on a given occasion is determined, on a given occasion, by these conventions, together with the intentions of the speaker and various contextual features […] If a speaker has a designator in his idiolect, certain conventions of his idiolect (given various facts about the world) determine the referent in the idiolect: that I call semantic referent (SRSR, p. 14) (He makes it clear in this paper that by "semantic" he means "truth-conditional"). Consider: (1) Aristotle was fond of dogs. A proper understanding of this statement involves an understanding both of the (extensionally correct) conditions under which it is in fact true, and of the conditions under which a counterfactual course of history, resembling the actual course in some respects but not in others, would be correctly (partially) described by (1). (NN p. 6) This is couched in terms of understanding, not of meaning. But I shall not persist on the distinction. I assume that these two are correlative notions. Again, in explaining the notion (or rule) of rigidity, Kripke says that it is "The rule that there is a single individual and a single property such that, with respect to every counterfactual situation, the truth conditions of the proposition are the possession of the property by that individual, in that situation. " (p. 10) This is a conception of meaning and understanding that dominates the course of argument in NN. It is, I believe, a novel one. What is its basis? Why should one, in order to understand the statement, know which counterfactual course of history would be correctly described by the statement? Kripke evidently thinks that this is not a stipulation concerning an artificial notion of meaning (in the formal semantics of systems of modal logic), but an explicative condition required by our intuitive notion of understanding. Kripke would agree, I suppose, with a conception, championed, e.g. by Dummett and ascribed by him to Frege, that the notion of meaning concerned should serve in an explanation of understanding. But unlike Frege (and Dummett) he thinks that this notion of meaning is intrinsically modal, in that the mastery and understanding of simple sentences involve understanding its truth conditions in counterfactual situations.
In thus saying that this notion is intrinsically modal I do not mean to imply that we are concerned here with the notion of the meaning of sentences involving modal operators, or with their role or meaning within complex sentences involving modal operators. Kripke is entirely clear on this, and he emphasizes the point again in the Preface to , where he also accuses Dummett of misunderstanding this point. 6 The doctrine of rigidity, he says, "is a doctrine about the truth conditions, with respect to counterfactual situations, of (the propositions expressed by) all sentences, Aristotle was not a philosopher, and had never seen dogs). And it is precisely these truth 6 Dummett probably remained unconvinced, for he repeats virtually the same point, ignoring
Kripke's remarks, in his The Interpretation of Frege, p. 184, and later in his "The Logical Basis of Metaphysics", Harvard, 1991, p.48.
7 I state this with great hesitation, for, in later writings Dummett seems to endorse the modal notion of meaning. See for instance "Could There Be Unicorns?" in The Seas of Language, p.
335b: "Any thesis about the meaning or reference of a word must draw its substance from how we use it or should use it in hypothetical circumstances"; cf. Also 340 c-341a.
conditions in a counterfactual course of history, which render the meaning of (1) different from that, e.g. of its Russellian analysis (p. 9).
It is reasonable to understand this Modal conception of meaning in a strong way according to which one should know the truth-conditions of (1) in any counterfactual course of history relevant to the sentence (under some specification of relevance here).
Thus, all counterfactual situations which differ from the actual ones concerning Aristotle, and all counterfactual situations which differ from the actual ones concerning dogs (for instance, a situation in which dogs are huge animals tearing to pieces whatever they can get hold of) should be relevant to understanding (1). (1) "Aristotle was fond of dogs". The argument proceeds in the following main steps.
1.
The Descriptive Claim: The sense of a name like "Aristotle" is given by a description, say, "The Greatest philosopher who studied under Plato".
2.
The synonymity assumption: A name and its sense-giving description are synonymous -have the same sense.
3.
The Kripkean counterfactual move: Imagine a counterfactual situation in which Aristotle never studied under Plato, and Antistenes was Plato's only student.
4.
The reference question: To whom does "Aristotle" refer in that counterfactual situation? -Obviously, to Aristotle, not to Antistenes.
5.
The meaning claim: The meaning of (1) determines also its truth conditions in the counterfactual situation described (and the meaning of "Aristotle" should be construed accordingly). (cf. NN p. 30; N. This is by now almost a standard move against the Fregean conception, and it is widely considered to be conclusive. But is it?
The argument seems to rely on some assumptions, which are worth spelling out:
a. The meaning of a sentence is couched in terms of truth conditions. b.
In general (perhaps always), the sense of a name is given by a description.
c. If "m" gives the meaning (sense) of "n", they are synonymous -have the same sense. e. Sense is "conceptual": it is basically a set of properties (or conditions) satisfaction of which is sufficient and necessary for determining the reference.
f. The modal conception of meaning -understanding a sentence involves understanding its truth conditions in counterfactual situations, and understanding a term is understanding its use in such situations.
I would like to make some comments on these assumptions from a Fregean perspective.
The issues are rather intricate and I must be very brief. Let me repeat, however, what I said at the beginning, that the following is written on the assumption of the ambitious reading of NN according to which it aims as an attack on a cognitive conception of the meaning of names, and not merely on a descriptive theory of names.
A. Sense and Truth Conditions -According to a wide-spread conception, meaning is given in terms of truth: the meaning of a sentence, according to this conception, is its truth-conditions. The meaning of other, sub-sentential expressions, is their systematic contribution to the meaning of all, or at least, a distinguished class of the sentences in which they occur. This picture is often ascribed to Frege, who is even acclaimed as being its inventor.
The term "meaning" is notoriously ambiguous as between Frege's late sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung). The aforementioned conception applies, of course, to meaning in the sense of sense. However, Frege, to my knowledge, never speaks of the sense of a sentence as its truth-conditions. By this I don't wish to deny the centrality of the notion of truth in Frege's conception of meaning (and of logic), but this in itself does not mean conceiving of the sense of a sentence as its truth-conditions. In Begriffsschrift "Every such name of a truth-value expresses a sense, a thought. Namely, by our stipulations it is determined under what conditions the name denotes the True. The sense of this name -the thought -is the thought that these conditions are fulfilled".
There is a marked difference between saying that the sense of a sentence is its truth-conditions, and saying, with Frege, that it is the thought that its truth-conditions are fulfilled. The most obvious difference is that truth-conditions are often construed extensionally: two sentences that are true in exactly the same conditions then have the same truth-conditions. On this view, the way the truth-conditions are given to us, the way we conceive of them is of no moment. This is evidently not true of In distinction to many alternative approaches, the Fregean conception is "modest", or non-reductive in its orientation. Sense is explained as the thought that the truthconditions are satisfied. Thought and its intrinsic opacity or perspectiveness are uneliminable. There can be two different thoughts, with respect to the same truth conditions, that these truth conditions are satisfied. Hence, though sense is "couched" in terms of truth conditions, Frege would reject the thesis that the sense of a sentence is its truth conditions.
B. The Descriptive claim -This is a central and a very wide-spread assumption, but it
has been rejected by many Frege scholars. I shall therefore not go into it in detail here.
The idea is that the description involved is, ultimately, "pure" or "completely universal" in senseless ("not in use") is given sense by stipulating a definition. This is a case, in which "giving the sense" of an expression is clear, and this is a case in which such a procedure results in stating a synonymity -the two expressions have the same sense. But this is a very special case, which is rare outside mathematics and logic, and even there cannot apply to all terms. In the case of most words (names) in a natural language, one does not "give" the sense of an expression by another. Rather, the sense is expressed by using the term to refer to its reference. And even when the sense may be suggested by another expression, they are not synonymous. The criterion of synonymity for Frege is that it must be self-evident, which is rarely, and with respect to proper names almost never, the case. Frege, are concepts -the references of predicates: "I call the concepts under which an object falls its properties" (CO p. 51)
Therefore, clearly, a sense is not a property (concept) or a set of properties. The sense of a name is the way in which its reference is presented or given to us, and Frege was very clear and persistent in distinguishing it from properties of the referent (object). It is also misleading to think of the sense of a term as a condition satisfaction of which determines the reference:
"Now it is easy to become unclear about this by confounding the division into concepts and objects with the distinction between sense and meaning (reference), so that we run together sense and concept on the one hand and meaning (reference) and object on the other" (PW p. 118).
Frege's conception of sense was intrinsically intentionalistic. A sense is not a mediating entity between a term (or a subject) and its reference -it is the way in which the reference is given, a way that is intrinsically connected to its reference. Frege's conception of reference is, in this light, direct; it is not mediated by a conceptual condition that the reference has to satisfy. 12 We thus see that the argument against Frege's conception of meaning is inconclusive, from a Fregean point of view, independently of the modal conception of meaning. In other words, a Fregean may accept this modal conception of meaning, without accepting the argument in its entirety -he may have enough degrees of freedom to incorporate the modal conception of meaning within the general principles of his theory of sense.
Kripke advances another main argument against the descriptive theory, and claims that the theory is wrong not only with regard to the meaning of names but also with regard to the determination of their reference. This kind of argument is exemplified in detail mainly in the second lecture of NN, and has often been referred to as "the epistemic argument". The descriptive theory allegedly claims that the reference of a name is determined by a description -"the so and so" -even though the description is not supposed to be giving the meaning (sense) of the name, i.e. the name and the description are not supposed to be synonymous. Kripke advances two arguments as against the theory.
(i) It is rarely, if ever, the case that a speaker knows or believes a description, which individuates the referent of a given name. Thus very few users of "Einstein" know or believe individuative descriptions about him (see e.g. pp. 80-2).
(ii) It is a fortiori not the case that even if the identity between a name and a description is in fact true, it is known a priori, as one could expect it to be if the referent of the name were determined by the description (see e.g. pp. 87-90). In other words, even if the description in fact applies to the referent of the name, we can easily conceive that it might turn out not to be so. And even if we strongly believe such an identity, we can easily imagine ourselves to be proved, after all, wrong.
There are two remarks I wish to make about this argument, and, since I am concerned in this paper mainly with the notion of meaning (not of reference) I shall be very brief here.
1) Few people, I believe, would deny (i). It is usually handled by some version of what
Putnam has called "the division of linguistic labor" (and to which Kripke himself hints in NN, see, ). But this seems to suggest that when the speech community is considered as a whole, and when we consider the meaning of a name in a language, not in this or that idiolect, Kripke's counterexamples loose much of their force. For in the community at large some identifying descriptions of the reference are known. It is moreover hard to see, on these conditions, how a name could have a reference without its being determined by some identifying description.
2) As to (ii), if considered as a thesis against Frege's view, much depends here on how one understands "sense" or "way of being given" or "a mode of presentation" (all translations of Frege's Art des Gegebeseins) in these contexts. Many scholars, including notably Dummett, construe this notion as "a way of determining the referent", something like a sort of an algorithm that one has to follow in order to get to the referent, as "a route to the reference" or a sort of a magic machine that one holds on to and slides down with it to the referent. In some very special contexts this picture of sense may be adequate and present Frege's views fairly, but as a general picture of the senses of names, and of the Fregean notion of "a mode of presentation", it is I believe, wrong and misleading. The mode of presentation of an object, the way it presents itself to us, as understood by Frege, need not lend itself to a non-circular descriptive articulation. The picture is naturally associated with the descriptive theory, but even when dissociated from it, it is, I believe, wrong. Debarred of this picture, there is no reason to expect a non-circular description to be a priori true of the referent. So here again, strong as the Kripkean arguments may seem to be against a descriptive theory, conjoined with the algorithmic picture of "determining the reference", they loose much of their force when directed against a cognitive approach, which is dissociated from these.
To sum up, I believe that although its ultimate philosophical grounds may be unclear, NN makes a strong case for an important, and quite novel, modal feature of the notion of meaning. But this conception, in itself, doesn't tell against the basic principles of
Frege's notion of sense. Rather, it can be incorporated within the framework of these principles. As noted in the beginning, NN may be read narrowly, as launching an attack on the descriptive conception of names. This of course is important enough, and from this perspective the question of whether Frege actually held such a position is of minor significance. NN may be read, however, more broadly as having a more ambitious aim: to discard any cognitive conception of meaning and of reference-determination. It is under this more ambitious reading that NN is rightly regarded as a landmark in the philosophy of language, and this, I believe, is the way many people have read it. For people like myself, who believe that Frege founded and paved a way for a viable cognitive conception of meaning, an argument against such a conception cannot disregard Frege's actual views (even if amended here there). If the arguments in NN are not directed against them as they are, its sting against a cognitive conception of sense is somewhat blunted.
This may hold good, however, also if we disregard Frege's actual views. It is enough if a non-descriptive, cognitive conceptions of sense and of reference determination are viable, if they can be based on the notion of a way of being given (objects and other types of referents). For any such view the Kripkean arguments may remain effective against a descriptive conception of sense and of reference determination, but leave untouched the other sort of cognitive approach to these notions.
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